82 research outputs found
Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this?
The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on
the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the
author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point
out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism”
and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to
introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness
of building the model of “Kantianism — Neo-Kantianism — Neo-Neo-Kantianism —
Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of
thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's
“Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to
be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical
concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically
correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood
in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism,
the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian
tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of
philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the
two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows
the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the
Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of
the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or
Hans-Michael Baumgartner
Neo-kantianism and Neo-hegelianism. Comments on Neo-philosophy
The article addresses the problem of neo-philosophy in the light of its relation
to philosophy while constituting its renewal. The subject matter of the reflection
is the analysis of neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism, whereas the result of the
conducted analyses is a conviction that it is not possible to speak of a simple
analogy between philosophy and neo-philosophy which relates to it. Even if this
analogy were possible in the case of neo-hegalianism, certainly such a situation
cannot and does not occur in the case of neo-kantianism. The latter is characterised
by a lack of orthodoxy in relation to Kant’s philosophy which in fact is its
characteristic feature
"Being Critical", Meaning What?
The article builds on the observation made by Josef Pieper, who writes about the critical attitude: “‘kritisch’ sein besage für den Philosophierenden so viel wie: sich darum bekümmern, daß nur ja nicht etwas ausgelassen wird.” Thus, the focus of the article is on the attempts to define philosophy through the prism of criticism,
undertaken by some of the most significant philosophers of the first half of the 20th century, such as Leonard Nelson, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers and Nicolai Hartmann
Kłopoty z filozofią
Książeczka ta została napisana z potrzeby podzielenia się z Czytelnikiem swoimi przemyśleniami dotyczącymi
zagadnienia statusu filozofii we współczesnej nauce. Żadne inne racje nie są w stanie wyjaśnić powodów, które
przyczyniły się do jej powstania. Jest nieudolną próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, które nieustannie powraca w świadomości próbującego filozofować, a które brzmi: czym jest filozofia, jaką uprawiam?. Czy w ogóle uprawiam filozofię, czy też – zgodnie z postulatem tych, którzy nie chcą poznać historii filozofii – historię filozofii tylko? Takiemu pytaniu towarzyszy nieuchronnie inne pytanie, które Stanisław Judycki wyraził w tytule artykułu opublikowanego na łamach „Przeglądu Filozoficznego”, a zatytułowanego Dlaczego filozofia jest trudna?. Odpowiedź na postawione pytania jest prozaiczna – filozofia jest trudna, gdyż nie jest prosta. To nieco żartobliwie – i z premedytacją – sformułowane powiedzenie można uznać za kwintesencję filozofowania
Filozof czystego poznania : rzecz o Hermannie Cohenie
Hermann Cohen remains one of the most important philosophers
of the turn of the 19th century. He is known first and foremost as
the founder of the Neo-Kantian Marburg School, which, alongside
the Baden School, constituted the primary center of philosophical
thought in Germany at that time. Nonetheless, Cohen has not been
widely recognized for his contributions to the study of philosophy
due to the fact that, because of his Jewish heritage, he worked at the
provincial University of Marburg in Hessia. The following monograph
accounts for his relative lack of recognition and thus begins
with an overview of Cohen’s biography. Following that introduction,
the monograph has been divided into two parts.
The first part concerns theoretical philosophy, which constituted
the cornerstone of Cohen’s doctrine. The Marburg Neo-Kantianism is
considered to be the most radical version of anti-psychologism and
logicism; nonetheless, Cohen started his career as a philosopher as
a disciple of Heymann (or Chajim) Steinthal, a linguist and a philosopher,
as well as Moritz (or Moses) Lazarus: the publishers of
the periodical Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.
In 1871, he published the first edition of Kants Theorie des Erfahrung,
which was later republished in 1885 and 1918. In this part of the
monograph, the author presents the evolution of Cohen’s ideas, who
gradually progressed toward radical anti-psychologism. This stance
is clearly reflected in his 1902 book Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, which
shows Cohen as a philosopher interested in grounding the notions
of philosophy and science. Cohen, then, is seen as a thinker who
searches for conditions which would guarantee the objective value of
cognition. Thus, his epistemological program becomes an alternative
for the phenomenology school of thought, which came to prominence
in the beginning of the 20th century.
Cohen remains convinced that the objective value of cognition
is irrevocably connected with a search for the source. The concept
which becomes crucial for his philosophy is the notion of the source (Ursprung), which for Cohen signifies a search for the rules which
govern cognition and which ensure its objective value. What is particularly
interesting about Cohen’s theory of cognition is the fact that
it constitutes an attempt at a transcendental grounding of cognition,
which is sometimes referred to as “a theory of cognition without
the subject” or “idealism without the subject.” This phrase, coined
by Manfred Brelage, has its origins in the fact that Cohen’s idealism
is a transcendental idealism par excellence. For that reason, Gerhard
Lehmann calls Cohen “the archpriest of science.”
The second part of the monograph is devoted to practical philosophy,
and ethics in particular. This ethics is connected with the
ethics of socialism, developed by the protoplast of the Marburg
School, even though Cohen is interested not so much in the subject
of the ethics itself, but rather in the grounding of ethics in science.
He is convinced that while mathematical natural history has its
grounding in logic, ethics has its groundings in jurisprudence. Next,
the author proceeds with an analysis of the philosophy of law, which
becomes even more interesting given the fact that Rudolf Stammler,
one of the most distinguished philosophers of the law of that period,
also belonged to the Marburg School. Thus, the author discusses
the conception of varying content of the law of nature. Moreover, it
should also be noted that—as Claudius Müller argues in his book—
during the time of the Nazi regime, libraries in Germany discarded
all books by Hermann Cohen, who was Jewish, as well as those of
Karl Vorländer, who was a socialist and one of Cohen’s students.
Moreover, the author focuses on the philosophy of religion—crucial
due to Cohen’s Judaism—as well as aesthetics and psychology.
The monograph constitutes an overview of Cohen’s views, painting
the thinker as a scholar determined to discover the foundation in
which he could ground his science. This process was so crucial for the
founder of the Marburg School that his philosophy is often equated
with constant critique. Martin Heidegger—involved with Marburg in
1923–1928—in his book Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20),
uses the figure of Rudolf Hermann Lotze, but doesn’t directly refer to
that fact. Meanwhile, Lotze, in his critique of the common practice of
grounding philosophy in the theory of cognition, writes, “[…] such
tasks are forced to find solutions: the constant sharpening of knives
is boring when there is nothing to be cut.” This sharpening of the
knives is, indeed, what seems to lie at the core of Cohen’s philosophy.
Nonetheless, what this monograph aims to emphasize is the
meaningfulness of the task
Herbert Schnadelbach, "Nasz nowy neokantyzm" (przekł.)
glowski poświęcony zagadnieniu Kant czy Hegel?, wówczas dla niektórych
pytanie to mogło brzmieć jak pseudoalternatywa. Niestety,
nie skorzystano wtedy z okazji przeprowadzenia ankiety dotyczącej
tego pytania, ale możemy być pewni, że ponad dziewięćdziesiąt procent
zajmujących się obecnie filozofią postawionych przed takim wyborem,
odpowiedziałoby: „Naturalnie, Kant!" Kto jeszcze dzisiaj chce
być heglistą? Wielu interpretuje Hegla — drobiazgowo i wytrwale, lecz
ich gotowość do tego, by także uargumentować jego filozofię, pozostaje
przy tym najczęściej w odwrotnym stosunku; zagadkowo oddziałuje
wówczas ich zapatrzenie w Hegla
Emil Lask. W stulecie śmierci
The present article concentrates on depicting the main elements of Emil Lask’s
philosophy, a distinguished Neo-Kantianist who, simultaneously, may be regarded as
Heidegger’s teacher. The meaning of Lask’s work comes down to several issues, although
in this article two of them have been emphasised: first, Kant should not be
read in the light of Fichte’s philosophy; second, in Lask’s philosophy the primacy of
practical reason in logic, characteristic for the Baden Neo-Kantianism, is questioned.
In Lask’s understanding, the logic of philosophy which is the critical theory of cognition
derives from the critical consideration over the Baden Neo-Kantianism
Historia filozofii - nauka niepotrzebna?
Pytanie o wzajemną relację między filozofią a jej historią należy do
pytań, które nieustannie powracają w refleksji filozoficznej. Najogólniej
rzecz ujmując, mamy oto trzy stanowiska, których raczej uzgodnić
się nie da. Pierwsze stanowisko, można by je nazwać stricte
filozoficznym, sprowadza się do twierdzenia, że filozofia jest czymś
zgoła odmiennym od historii filozofii. Tym samym uprawiający filozofię
sytuuje się ponad historią filozofii, uznając ją za naukę pomocniczą
samej filozofii. Trudność pojawia się tu w jednej sytuacji,
a mianowicie wówczas, gdy filozofujący nie zna historii filozofii. Stanowisko
drugie — będące całkowitym zaprzeczeniem pierwszego —
to stanowisko, które można określić mianem stricte historycznego
Filozofia a psychologia : próba charakterystyki problemu
The relationship between psychology and philosophy is one of the most important problems
of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, in which it reveals itself twice. It is the first time in
the post-Kantian philosophy and is associated with such thinkers as Jakob Friedrich Fries, Friedrich
Eduard Beneke, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Jürgen Bona Meyer. The second time in the
late nineteenth century, when the problem of psychologism arises. Apart from pointing out the
radical antipsychology of the Marburg Neokantian School, there are two controversies. The first
one is a discussion between Wilhelm Dilthey and Hermann Ebbinghaus, the second one is a criticism
of psychologism by Edmund Husserl. This is interesting because Husserl's understanding of
psychology is directly related to his reference to the representative of the Marburg School, Paul
Natorp
Teoria idei Platona a matematyka
Przekład z języka niemieckiego artykułu Hermanna Cohen'a
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